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Bello

貝優(yōu)

Dallying with a monster

玩火自焚

In failing to snuff out vigilantism, Mexico is runningbig risks

自發(fā)群眾運(yùn)動(dòng)遏制失敗，墨西哥厝火積薪

THE rule of law has long been a stranger to the sweltering lowlands known as the Tierra Calientein the Mexican state of Michoacan. The site of battles over land in the 1940s and 1950s, thearea suffered an exodus of migrant workers to California. In the 1970s the drug trade tookroot there, attracted by the proximity of the por to fLazaro Cardenasand the remoteness ofthe federal government inMexico City. Not content with trafficking methamphetamines, thelatest mafia to lord it over the Tierra Caliente, the whimsically named “Knights Templar”,established a tight grip over its invertebrate society, co-opting local authorities, extortingprotection money and raping women.

在墨西哥米卻肯州名為T(mén)ierra Caliente的悶熱低地，法律法規(guī)早為人熟視無(wú)睹。20世紀(jì)40年代至50年代，這一地區(qū)飽受土地戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)洗禮，大量工人涌至加利福尼亞。因毗鄰拉薩羅卡德納斯港，遠(yuǎn)離墨西哥城聯(lián)邦政府，70年代毒品交易于此根深蒂固。最近，“Knights Templar”黑幫在此盤(pán)踞，其名稱(chēng)極為古怪，繼冰毒走私無(wú)法滿足其胃口，又緊鑼密鼓的占領(lǐng)了這一軟弱無(wú)力的地區(qū)，選出地方政府，敲詐保護(hù)費(fèi)，凌辱婦女。

That proved too much for the Tierra Caliente's ranchers and lime-growers. A year ago theyrebelled, forming “self-defence groups”. These vigilantes now control 26 of Michoacan's 113municipal districts. When earlier this year they threatened to storm Apatzingan, a town of99,000, President Enrique Pe?a Nieto dispatched a federal official, Alfredo Castillo, and a squadof federal policemen. Mr Castillo struck agreements with the vigilantes: they will be vetted, intheory at least, and then join an ill-defined “rural defence corps” under the army's aegis.

當(dāng)?shù)氐哪翀?chǎng)主及酸橙種植戶忍無(wú)可忍，于一年前揭竿而起，成立自衛(wèi)組織。如今這些自發(fā)群眾已控制米卻肯州113個(gè)地區(qū)中的26個(gè)。今年伊始，他們威脅稱(chēng)著手攻克阿帕欽甘—一99000人的鎮(zhèn)。總統(tǒng)裴納尼托派遣聯(lián)邦官員Alfredo Castillo以及一中隊(duì)聯(lián)邦警察處理此事，Castillo與自發(fā)群眾達(dá)成協(xié)議，至少?gòu)睦碚撋隙�言，他們要接受審查，并編入農(nóng)村防衛(wèi)軍接受軍隊(duì)保護(hù)，但該防衛(wèi)軍定義模糊。

The vigilantes have attracted sympathy from right and left inMexico, which see them aslegitimate expressions of popular desperation in the face of mafia violence and official neglect.The government seems perplexed. Mr Castillo said he would restore order “in 15 days”, butthere is no sign that he has a thought-out strategy to deal either with the vigilantes or thelawlessness that spawned them.

墨西哥左派和右派對(duì)自發(fā)群眾深為同情，認(rèn)為他們?cè)诤趲偷谋┝εc政府的不作為中，以合法的方式，傳達(dá)出普遍的絕望。政府似乎手足無(wú)措，Castillo稱(chēng)他將在15天內(nèi)恢復(fù)秩序，但他并沒(méi)有一個(gè)經(jīng)過(guò)深思熟慮的方略，處理這些自發(fā)組織的群眾，解決釀成此事的法律缺失。

That is alarming, especially since the germ of vigilantism has appeared elsewhere inMexico.Experience in other Latin American countries suggests that Mr Pe?a's people risk dallying with amonster.Colombiais the most notorious case. In the 1980s landowners and ranchers, faced withattacks by left-wing guerrillas, organised vigilante groups. These quickly mushroomed into theUnited Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, a national organisation of over 20,000 paramilitarieswho slaughtered tens of thousands of civilians and stole their land while morphing into drug-trafficking outfits. Although most disbanded after a government security build-up, remnantshave murdered more than 60 farmers to thwart efforts to restore stolen land to its rightfulowners.

自發(fā)運(yùn)動(dòng)在墨西哥其他地區(qū)出現(xiàn)之后，尤其觸目警心。其他拉美國(guó)家的經(jīng)歷表明墨西哥人民將玩火自焚。哥倫比亞便是一個(gè)臭名昭著的例子。80年代，地主和牧場(chǎng)主遭到由群眾自發(fā)組織的左翼游擊戰(zhàn)攻擊，后來(lái)發(fā)展為哥倫比亞聯(lián)合自衛(wèi)隊(duì)，這一國(guó)家組織由超過(guò)2000名準(zhǔn)軍事成員組成，并逐漸演變?yōu)槎酒纷咚浇M織，屠殺了成百上千名平民，奪走了他們的土地。雖然政府安全部隊(duì)建立后，自衛(wèi)隊(duì)大多解體，但殘余勢(shì)力仍殺害了60名農(nóng)民，企圖阻撓土地回歸合法擁有者。

On the face of things, Peru's experience of vigilantism was more successful. Villagers inCajamarca, in the country's northern Andes, formed rondas campesinas (a sort ofneighbourhood watch) in the 1970s, to tackle cattle-rustling and rural crime. Further south,around Ayacucho and theApurimac valley, in the 1980s and 1990s the army fostered lightlyarmed peasant self-defence committees. These helped defeat the Shining Path, a Maoistguerrilla group.

表面來(lái)看，秘魯?shù)娜罕娮孕l(wèi)組織經(jīng)歷更為成功。70年代，該國(guó)安第斯北部Cajamarca省的群眾自衛(wèi)組織對(duì)周邊起到了一種監(jiān)視作用，處理偷牛及其他農(nóng)村犯罪案件。在80年代和90年代的Ayacucho和 Apurimac 山村，在軍隊(duì)的支持下，這里成立了輕武裝農(nóng)民自衛(wèi)委員會(huì)，這對(duì)抵御光輝道路游擊隊(duì)，即毛派人游擊隊(duì)大有裨益。

Although the Shining Path has long since faded, the vigilantes are stronger than ever. In theApurimacvalley, they have turned into well-armed militias of coca growers. In Cajamarca therondas are now led by rural schoolteachers from a far-left party; they battle mining companiesand are the real power in the land, says Rubén Vargas, a security consultant.

雖然光輝道路游擊隊(duì)很久以前就衰弱，但自那以后群眾自衛(wèi)組織的勢(shì)力日趨強(qiáng)大。在Apurimac山村，他們已成為武裝精良的古柯種植者。在卡哈馬卡，監(jiān)視部隊(duì)如今受極左黨派的學(xué)校教師領(lǐng)導(dǎo)，安全顧問(wèn)Rubén Vargas說(shuō)，他們與礦業(yè)公司對(duì)抗，獨(dú)霸一方。

The common element in all three countries is the weakness of law enforcement in rural areas.That is what tempts governments and security forces to ally themselves with vigilantes. Thiscan bring short-term results against guerrillas or drug-traffickers, but in the long run it makesthings worse. As Mauricio Romero, a political scientist at Javeriana University in Bogota, pointsout, once vigilantes acquire coercive power, the temptation to use this for private ends—revenge attacks, drug-trafficking or other criminal activities—is simply too great.

三國(guó)的共同點(diǎn)在于農(nóng)村法律缺位，這也是政府和安保部隊(duì)與自發(fā)群眾部隊(duì)聯(lián)合的原因。短期內(nèi)，此舉有助于抗擊游擊部隊(duì)和毒品走私販，但長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的境況只會(huì)江河日下。如Bogota Javeriana大學(xué)政治學(xué)家MauricioRomero所言，一旦這些自發(fā)部隊(duì)獲強(qiáng)制權(quán)，為己所用，從事復(fù)仇行動(dòng)，毒品走私及其他犯罪行為的誘惑無(wú)從遏制。

The embryo of the monster is already implanted in the Tierra Caliente. The self-defence forcesturn out to have members with dubious pasts and the kind of weaponry—assault rifles andimprovised armoured cars—that is the trademark of narcos. They have split into warringfactions, and are imposing and ejecting mayors.

惡魔的胚芽已在Tierra Caliente植根，自衛(wèi)軍中，部分人經(jīng)歷可疑，裝備有突擊步槍類(lèi)的武器以及拼湊而成的裝甲車(chē)—販毒的標(biāo)志，他們分化成對(duì)立的小股部隊(duì)，欺壓和排擠市長(zhǎng)。

Mr Pe?a entered office with one big new idea on security: speedily to set up a ruralgendarmerie of at least 40,000 troops, retrained as policemen, fromMexico's unnecessarily largearmy. By putting bodies on the ground and protecting the politicians and judges, this forcewould have been tailor-made for Tierra Caliente. But the army and state governors killed theplan. Instead, a much smaller gendarmerie of 5,000 civilian recruits will launch later this year.That seems too little, too late. For all its recent successes against drug kingpins, the politicaldefeat over the gendarmerie may come to haunt Mr Pe?a and his administration.

Pe?a總統(tǒng)懷揣著一個(gè)有關(guān)安全問(wèn)題的宏偉想法走入辦公室，即加快步伐，從墨西哥的冗兵中抽調(diào)至少有40000人，建立一農(nóng)村憲兵隊(duì)，作為警察發(fā)揮效用，抗擊威脅，保護(hù)政客法官，這支武裝力量對(duì)Tierra Caliente負(fù)責(zé)。但軍隊(duì)及州政府否決了這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃，他們將在今年年底通過(guò)平民招募成立一支遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)要小的武裝，只有5000人來(lái)取而代之。此武裝似乎力量單薄，成立過(guò)晚. 考慮到它最近打擊毒梟的功績(jī)，Pe?a政府可能為憲兵隊(duì)上的政治失利耿耿于懷。

1.fail to 未能

例句:The movie's special effects fail to dazzle.

這部電影的特效未能出彩。

2.face with 面對(duì)

例句:He had an angular face with prominentcheekbones.

他的臉棱角分明，顴骨突出。

3.more than 超過(guò)

例句:He had notched up more than 25 victories worldwide.

他已贏得了超過(guò)25次國(guó)際級(jí)別賽事的勝利。

4.split into 分裂成

例句:Now if a great lake like Victoria were to dry up partially, it would be split into a number ofseparate, smaller lakes.

現(xiàn)在如果像維多利亞湖這樣的大湖部分干涸，它就會(huì)被分成若干獨(dú)立的小湖泊。